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The “individual mandate”—the 
requirement that individuals either have 
health insurance coverage or pay a fine—
is both the best known and the least 
popular component of the Affordable 
Care Act (ACA).1 That people know about 
the mandate—and may even worry 
about it—is not surprising, given both 
the heated political controversy and the 
constitutional challenge surrounding 
this provision of the law. What may be 
surprising, however, is that if the ACA 
were in effect today, 94 percent of the 
total population (93 percent of the 
nonelderly population) or 250.3 million 
people out of 268.8 million  nonelderly 
people—would not face a requirement to 
newly purchase insurance or pay a fine.
In this brief we use the Urban Institute’s 
Health Insurance Policy Simulation 
Model (HIPSM) to estimate the number 
and share of Americans potentially 
subject to the mandate, identify their 
insurance status absent the ACA, and 
simulate eligibility for Medicaid and 
exchange-based premium and cost-
sharing subsidies.2 To allow the most 
direct comparison of postreform 
coverage with coverage absent reform, 
our analysis treats the provisions of 
the ACA as if fully implemented in 
2011. The table presents the results of 
this analysis—with estimates of the 
population exempt from the mandate; 
the population potentially affected 
by the mandate, but already covered 
by insurance of some type; and the 
remaining population required to newly 
purchase coverage or pay a fine.
Starting from the top, our analysis 
shows that if the ACA were fully in 
effect in 2011, 87.4 million nonelderly 
Americans—33 percent of the 
population under age 65 would be 
explicitly exempt from the individual 
responsibility requirement. These are 
people whose incomes fall below the 
tax filing threshold, those for whom 
the direct premium of the lowest cost 
available plan exceeds 8 percent of 
family income,3 and undocumented 
immigrants. (Also exempt from the 
mandate, but beyond our capacity to 
estimate, are people found to have 
other economic hardship or religious 
objections, Native Americans, those 
without coverage for less than three 
months, and incarcerated individuals.) 
Almost three-quarters of the exempt 
population already have health insurance 
coverage of some type today; a little 
more than one-quarter is uninsured.
Of the remaining 181 million Americans 
under the age of 65 who are subject to 
the mandate, 86 percent are estimated 
to have health insurance without reform. 
HIPSM simulates that 95 percent of 
those with some type of insurance 
coverage (employer, nongroup, public) 
without reform will have the same type 
of coverage under the ACA (data not 
shown). Virtually all of the remaining 5 
percent will obtain coverage through 
a different route under reform than 
they do today (e.g., some of those with 
nongroup coverage today will get an 
employer offer of coverage under reform, 
and will take that up instead of buying 
nongroup, and vice versa). In short, the 
vast majority of those potentially subject 
to the individual mandate have coverage 
today and will not obtain a different type 
of coverage postreform. 
Forty-three percent of the population 
potentially subject to the individual 
responsibility requirement receive 
coverage through large employers; 
12 percent receive coverage through 
small employers; and 7 percent have 
employer-based coverage from an 
unobserved source (most commonly 
a family member living in another 
household or a previous employer); 
almost all of these people will continue 
to obtain their coverage through the 
same route once the reforms are fully in 
place. Five percent purchase coverage 
in the nongroup market, and 17 
percent have coverage through a public 
program (e.g., Medicaid, Children’s 
Health Insurance Program (CHIP), 
military); again, almost all will continue 
to do so once the reforms are fully in 
place. Although those already covered 
by nongroup or small group coverage 
will not be newly purchasing coverage 
under the reforms, some will have their 
coverage broadened somewhat so that it 
satisfies the ACA’s minimum or “essential 
health benefits” requirements. 
About 26.3 million Americans who are 
currently uninsured will be required to 
newly obtain coverage or pay a fine. In 
this group, 8.1 million people will be 
eligible to receive free or close-to-free 
insurance through Medicaid or CHIP 
and can avoid the mandate penalties if 
they do so; hence our finding that 18.2 
million Americans (6 percent of the total 
population, 7 percent of the nonelderly 
population) will be required to newly 
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purchase coverage or face a penalty. Of 
that 18.2 million, 10.9 million people 
will be eligible to receive subsidies 
toward private insurance premiums in 
the newly established health insurance 
exchanges, but will have to make partial 
contributions toward their coverage. 
About 7.3 million people—2 percent 
of the total population (3 percent of 
the population under age 65)—are not 
offered any financial assistance under the 
ACA and will be subject to penalties if 
they do not obtain coverage. 
While the number of people who will 
be required to newly purchase coverage 
or pay a penalty is small compared 
with the total population, the individual 
responsibility requirement will still make 
an important difference in the premium 
levels and long-term stability of the 
nongroup and small group insurance 
markets under the ACA.  Almost 11 
million people uninsured without reform 
and subject to the mandate will be 
eligible to purchase subsidized nongroup 
coverage in order to comply with the 
coverage requirement; and many of the 
7 million not eligible for subsidies will 
also comply by purchasing coverage 
in the nongroup market, because they 
will not have access to employer-
sponsored insurance (ESI). The nongroup 
market now covers about 14 million 
people, so several million additional 
enrollees brought in by the coverage 
requirement will change premiums in 
the market noticeably. In addition, the 
consumer protections introduced by 
the ACA, which will guarantee issue 
of insurance products and prohibit 
premium variations due to health status 
and claims experience, could lead some 
of those currently healthy and insured 
in these markets to leave them in the 
absence of the coverage requirement. 
By encouraging the currently insured 
healthier individuals to stay in these 
markets and attracting newly insured 
healthy individuals into them as well, the 
individual responsibility requirement 
leads to lower premiums and more stable 
insurance markets than would be the 
case without it. We find that premiums in 
the nongroup market would be 10 to 20 
percent higher on average without the 
individual coverage requirement.4
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The Individual Responsibility Requirement*
Number of People  
(millions) % of Subgroup % of Nonelderly % of Total Population
Total Nonelderly 268.8 – 100% 87%
Number Exempt from Individual Responsibility
Requirement, Regardless of Postreform 
Coverage Decision
87.4 100% 33% 28%
Coverage in Baseline 63.4 73% 24% 20%
Large Firm ESI 20.4 23% 8% 7%
Small Firm ESI 5.3 6% 2% 2%
Unknown Firm Size ESI 10.9 12% 4% 4%
Non-Group 4.9 6% 2% 2%
Public 22.0 25% 8% 7%
Uninsured 24.0 27% 9% 8%
Undocumented Immigrants 7.3 8% 3% 2%
Income Below Tax Filing Threshold 14.3 16% 5% 5%
No Access to Affordable Coverage 2.4 3% 1% 1%
Number Potentially Subject to Individual
Responsibility Requirement if Uninsured 181.4 100% 67% 59%
Coverage in Baseline 155.1 86% 58% 50%
Large Firm ESI 78.3 43% 29% 25%
Small Firm ESI 22.6 12% 8% 7%
Unknown Firm Size ESI 13.0 7% 5% 4%
Non-Group 9.6 5% 4% 3%
Public 31.6 17% 12% 10%
Uninsured 26.3 14% 10% 8%
Eligible for Medicaid Under Reform 8.1 4% 3% 3%
Eligible for Exchange Subsidies Under Reform 10.9 6% 4% 4%
Access to Affordable Unsubsidized Coverage 7.3 4% 3% 2%
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2011.
*Note: We simulate the provisions of the Affordable Care Act fully implemented in 2011.
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Endnotes
1 Kaiser Family Foundation. Health Tracking Poll, 
March 2012. http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/
upload/8285-F.pdf.  
2 HIPSM simulates the decisions of businesses 
and individuals in response to policy changes, 
such as Medicaid expansions, new health 
insurance options, subsidies for the purchase of 
health insurance, and insurance market reforms. 
The model provides estimates of changes in 
government and private spending, premiums, 
rates of employer offers of coverage, and health 
insurance coverage resulting from specific 
reforms. For more information on HIPSM and a 
list of recent publications using the model, see 
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412154-
Health-Microsimulation-Capabilities.pdf.
3 Here we assume that dependents without 
access to a family premium (either through 
employer-based coverage or the exchange) 
whose direct cost to the family is less than 
or equal to 8 percent of income will not be 
subject to a penalty for being uninsured. This 
is an interpretation consistent with the spirit 
of the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. See: US 
Department of the Treasury, “Health insurance tax 
credit,” Federal Register 2011; 76(159):50931-49.
4 For a discussion of these results and other 
effects of eliminating the coverage requirement, 
see Matthew Buettgens and Caitlin Carroll, 
“Eliminating the Individual Mandate: Effects 
on Premiums, Coverage, and Uncompensated 
Care” (Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 
2012), http://www.urban.org/health_policy/url.
cfm?ID=412480.
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